The literature has identified three main approaches to account for the way exchange rate regimes are chosen: i) the optimal currency area theory; ii) the financial view, which highlights the consequences of international financial integration; and iii) the political view, which stresses the use of exchange rate anchors as credibility enhancers in politically challenged economies. Using de facto and de jure regime classifications, we test the empirical relevance of these approaches separately and jointly. We find overall empirical support for all of them, although the incidence of financial and political aspects varies substantially between industrial and nonindustrial economies. Furthermore, we find that the link between de facto regimes and their underlying fundamentals has been surprisingly stable over the years, suggesting that the global trends often highlighted in the literature can be traced back to the evolution of their natural determinants, and that actual policies have been little influenced by the frequent twist and turns in the exchange rate regime debate.
I. Introduction
Much of the recent policy discussion on exchange rate regimes has focused mostly on the trends in regime choice as if this were largely independent from country-specific characteristics
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. Following this interpretation, it is argued that after the early experiments with floats prompted by the collapse of Bretton Woods, we witnessed a regained popularity of pegs in the 80s and early 90s, to a large degree owing to their presumed beneficial effects on taming inflation. However, the stream of currency crises that started with the devaluation of the Mexican peso in 1994 have cast doubt on their sustainability, and the ephemeral enthusiasm with "hard" pegs (particularly, currency boards) advocated by the bipolar view was further debunked by the Argentine debacle. As a result, in recent years there has been a growing consensus in favor of flexible arrangements.
Yet such temporary fads, and the "one-size-fits-all" view of exchange rate arrangements that underlies them, seem at odds with both the casual evidence and the conventional wisdom that indicate that the regime choice is itself endogenous to the local and global economic contexts. This endogeneity of exchange rate regimes has not gone unnoticed in the economic literature. On the contrary, over the last forty years a large body of analytical work has provided key insights on the potential determinants of the regime choice. This paper tests whether, and to what extent, the alternative approaches identified by the literature help explain the choice of exchange rate regimes.
In addition, we explore whether the drivers underlying the choice of exchange rate regimes have changed over time, to assess to what extent, if any, the evolution in the intellectual debate on exchange rate arrangements influenced the policies actually chosen by policymakers.
Our results are quite revealing. We find that, once all contending hypotheses are considered jointly, the choice of exchange rate regimes can indeed be traced back to a few simple determinants that include a combination of trade, financial and political variables. Moreover, we find that the way countries choose their exchange rate regime in response to these basic determinants has not changed substantially over the last two decades, suggesting that the frequent twists and turns that characterized the exchange rate regime debate in academic and policy circles did not affect actual exchange rate policy to any significant degree.
To our knowledge, most of the empirical exploration of the determinants of the choice of regimes has been partial, focusing on a particular hypothesis without approaching the subject in a comprehensive model that encompasses all available candidate explanations -a concern given the frequently high correlation between the associated variables. Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1998) , for example, center on the implications of the optimal currency area theory, Eichengreen et al (2002) on "original sin", and Stein and Frieden (2001) on political economy variables. The few attempts to tackle the issue from a broader perspective (for example, Edwards, 1996; Rizzo, 1998 ; and the characteristics of the shocks the economy is subject to; 4 ii) the financial view, which highlights the consequences of international financial integration; 5 and iii) and the political view, which regards the use of a peg (or, more generally, an exchange rate anchor) as a "policy crutch" for governments lacking (nominal and institutional) credibility. 67 Our overall results using de facto regimes provide strong support for each of these views, although some of them apply differently for industrial and nonindustrial economies. In particular, we find that the implications of OCA theory carry through in both groups of countries. By contrast, whereas financial integration tends to foster flexible regimes among industrialized countries -in line with the impossible trinity view-, it increases the propensity to peg among non-industrial countries -something that we attribute to the fact that integration in those countries is strongly correlated with foreign currency-denominated external liabilities and larger currency mismatches, as documented by Eichengreen et al. (2003) . We also find support for the political view, albeit in a qualified version: pegs are more likely if the country lacks a good institutional track record, but less likely if the government is too weak to sustain them. Specifically, we find the choice of a peg to be negatively correlated with institutional quality -a result consistent with the policy crutch view-, but positively correlated with political strength -hinting at 4 While this tradeoff is often associated with the traditional Mundell-Fleming framework, the view of exchange rates as real shock absorbers dates back to the work of Meade (1950) . 5 This approach comprises the impossible trinity argument that stresses the role of increased capital mobility as a factor limiting the effectiveness of pegs (see, i.e., Rose, 1994; Fischer, 2001; and Obstfeld and Taylor, 2002) , and the currency mismatch argument that claims that exchange rate variability in financially dollarized emerging economies is contained due to their deleterious balance sheet effects (see, i.a., Reinhart , 2002, and Eichengreen and Hausmann, 1999) . 6 See Drazen (2000) and references there. 7 Of course there may be other reasons for the choice of exchange rate regimes that we have left out of the analysis. One that comes to mind is the objective of fixing to ensure competitiveness and avoid overvaluations (see Aizenman and Lee, 2005 and Prasad et al, 2006) . Because the universe would be potentially too large in this paper we have focused on the main hypotheses. a sustainability problem. Indeed, we find that, although non-peg countries are more likely to adopt de jure (but not a de facto) peg in an inflationary context, most of these inflation-induced de jure pegs are ultimately short lived, a result that is consistent with recent work by Klein and Schambaugh (2006) . Finally, by recovering the time dummies estimated in our baseline specification, we can study whether the evolution of regimes over the last decades displays any particular time pattern beyond and above that spanned by our set of basic controls. The estimation based on the IMF's de jure classification reveals a clear trend throughout the 80s and 90s: a strong "peg bias" in the early years that narrows steadily to virtually disappear by the end of the period. However, when we repeat the exercise based on de facto regimes, we find no discernible time pattern. From these findings, we conclude: i) that the trends often highlighted in the recent exchange rate regime debate, visible in the evolution of de jure regimes, are not reflected in de facto exchange rate policies, and ii) that actual regime choices can be traced back to the evolution of regime determinants rather than to a changing view of the relative merits of different arrangements: if anything, the debate can be credited for the increasing reluctance to adopt explicit exchange rate commitments at odds with underlying fundamentals.
II. The Theories of Exchange Rate Regimes Determination
Our exploration of the determinants of exchange rate regimes is centered on three main approaches that have long been part of the open economy macroeconomics toolkit: the theory of optimal currency areas (OCA), the financial integration approach (specifically, the incidence of the impossible trinity and balance sheet effects), and the political economy view of pegs as credibility enhancers.
In each case, a key aspect of the exercise consists in finding variables that capture, as close as possible, the factors highlighted by the theory. Since the choice of particular variables is bound to be controversial, we first evaluate a number of alternative controls for each of the three approaches separately. To do so, we run pooled logit regressions for an unbalanced panel data set of 183 countries over the post-Bretton Woods period on each set of controls. 8 We then run a parsimonious specification that includes all controls selected in the partial tests, to assess the relative importance of each set of explanations.
As noted, an important novelty of this paper lies in its focus on de facto exchange rate regimes. More precisely, our empirical exercises use as dependent variable a peg dummy that takes a value of one if a country is classified as a de facto fixed exchange rate regime (and a value of zero otherwise) according to the de facto regime classification assembled by Levy Sturzenegger (2003, 2005) .
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OCA theory
The first group of factors potentially underpinning the choice of regime is related to the geographical and trade aspects identified by the theory of optimal currency areas. This approach to the fix vs. float dilemma weighs the 8 Appendix 1 lists the countries in our sample, grouped into the industrial and non-industrial categories. 9 The robustness of the results to the standard IMF-based de jure classification, as well as Reinhart and Rogoff´s (2004) alternative de facto classification is addressed below.
trade and welfare gains from a stable exchange rate vis à vis the rest of the world (or, more precisely, the country's main trade partners) against the benefits of exchange rate flexibility as a shock adjuster in the presence of nominal rigidities.
According to this argument, country characteristics that favor a more stable (or fixed) exchange rate are openness (which enhances the trade gains derived from stable bilateral exchange rates) 10 , smallness (indirectly through the higher propensity of small economies to trade internationally, and directly by limiting the scope for the use of a national unit of account), and the concentration of the country's trade with the peg currency country (which, again, increases the gains from reducing the bilateral exchange rate volatility).
11
Regarding the incidence of real shocks, the traditional Mundell-Flemming framework argues that, in order to minimize output fluctuations, fixed (flexible) exchange rates are to be preferred if nominal (real) shocks are the main source of disturbance in the economy.
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For example, high volatility of terms of trade would provide a rationale for a float. Moreover, to the extent that real shocks become increasingly important due to growing trade flows and capital market integration (alternatively, as monetary shocks or inflation concerns become less of a priority) one should expect to see a global trend towards more flexible arrangements.
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10 An alternative explanation relies on Cavallo and Frankel (2004) who show that open economies are less prone to a sudden stop, thus reducing the benefits of flexibility. 11 In the case of pegs to a basket of currencies, the reference currency is the main currency in the basket peg. For intermediate and floating regimes, the reference currency is assumed to be the one that exhibits the least volatility relative to the local currency among major international currencies and currencies of the main regional partners. See Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) for details. 12 Classic references on this are Fleming (1962) and Mundell (1963 . The expected sign is shown in the first column. As can be seen, the theory is strongly supported by the data. For non-industrial countries (column ii), all coefficients show the correct sign and are highly significant. For industrial countries the results remains virtually unchanged, with the exception of the trade concentration variable, which is statistically significant but of the wrong sign (column iii). However, closer examination reveals that this result is driven mostly by one significant outlier, Canada, which exhibits very with the probability that a country selects a peg. Eichengreen et al (2002) propose the following explanation: "fixed exchange rate regimes should result in deeper financial markets, which should be particularly important in economies facing important terms of trade shocks". However, two recent papers by Broda (2004) and Edwards and Levy-Yeyati (2005) using de facto classifications of exchange rate regimes provide empirical evidence that pegs indeed exhibit larger output sensitivity to real shocks. 14 The use of Frankel and Romer´s (1999) measure of openness to mitigate endogeneity problems yields similar results at the cost of fewer observations. We come back to the issue of endogeneity below. 15 An alternative would have been to use the trade with the whole block of countries pegged to the reference country as in Klein and Shambaugh (2004) and Meissner and Oomes (2006) . 16 Appendix 2 presents a list of variables and sources, as well as a Table with summary descriptive statistics. 17 In this and following tables we report the coefficient of the pooled logit estimation that allows verifying statistical significance. For brevity only when we estimate our baseline estimation below we focus on quantitative effects by estimating the impact of each variable on the probability of choosing a peg. concentrated trade (with the US) and yet runs a floating exchange rate regime. In fact, when we exclude Canada from the sample (column iv), the coefficient for trade concentration, while significant only at 14%, shows a positive coefficient.
The financial view
A key ingredient of the textbook Mundell-Fleming framework is the assumption of perfect capital mobility that implies international interest rate arbitrage across countries in the form of the uncovered interest parity. From this framework, it follows that monetary policies in open economies cannot be aimed both at maintaining stable exchange rates and smoothing out cyclical output fluctuations due to real shocks. This is usually referred to as the "impossible trinity," namely, the fact that policymakers can choose at most two out the three vortexes of the trinity (capital mobility, monetary policy and a fixed exchange rate). Obstfeld and Taylor (2002) link the evolution of exchange rate arrangements to the historical phases of financial globalization, based on this "impossible trinity" argument.
They argue that, while capital mobility prevailed at a time when monetary policy was subordinated to exchange rate stability (as in the gold standard), as soon as countries attempted to use monetary policy to revive their economies during WWI, they had to impose controls to curtail capital movements.
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Inverting their argument, it has been argued that, as financial globalization deepened in the last decades, monetary policy became 18 On the same point, see Bordo and Flandreau (2001 In addition, a rapid process of financial deepening and innovation (which typically has advanced pari passu with financial integration in international capital markets) has gradually reduced the effectiveness of capital controls, with the same consequences in terms of the monetary policy-exchange rate stability dilemma.
Recent literature has stressed that currency mismatches in financially dollarized economies may also be critical to the choice of exchange rate regimes. In particular, countries with important (private or public) foreign liabilities may be more prone to fix (either de jure or de facto) due to the deleterious impact of sharp nominal depreciation of the currency on the solvency of balance sheets with currency mismatches.
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Notice that this channel, if present, may undo the positive relationship between capital account openness and flexible regimes suggested by the impossible trinity argument. To the extent that financial openness induces large swings in capital flows that in turn lead to large changes in the value of the exchange rate, financially dollarized countries may find it more convenient to fix rather than float merely for prudential reasons, a phenomenon that has been dubbed "fear of floating" by Calvo and Reinhart (2002) . As the authors argue, "defaults and general debt servicing difficulties mount if the exchange rate is allowed to slide," which "may help explain why, at least historically, there has been a marked tendency in most countries to confine exchange rate movements to relatively narrow bands..." Thus, disentangling empirically these two countervailing aspects -impossible trinity and currency mismatches-is particularly challenging in the case of non-industrial economies, many of which tend to exhibit important levels of financial dollarization. Moreover, in most cases, financial integration is likely to be correlated with larger stocks of foreign liabilities denominated in a foreign currency, rendering balance sheet considerations relatively more pressing. In this regard, it is important to note that, as holders of foreign assets and liabilities differ (at least from a legal point of view), a sudden devaluation is likely to hurt dollar debtors irrespective of the amount of foreign assets owned by the country's residents; hence, our focus on gross (as opposed to net) foreign liabilities as a measure of the currency mismatch.
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With this in mind, we examine the following five alternative variables to capture the influence of financial linkages on the choice of regime:
Chinn and Ito´s (2002) Restrictions with a higher number indicating a lower overall level of restrictions.
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ii)
The sum of the absolute value of inward and outward flows of portfolio investments and financial derivatives (sourced from the International Financial Statistics) as a share of GDP (Portfolio), a measure of de facto capital account openness.
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iii) A financial development dummy (FinDev), equal to one when the country belongs to the industrial group or when it is included in the JP Morgan's EMBI Global index.
24
iv) The country's gross stock of foreign assets over GDP (CumLoans), an alternative measure of de facto capital account openness, where the asset stock (computed by Lane and Milesi-Ferreti, 2001) is measured as the cumulative flows of portfolio debt assets, other assets and net errors and omissions.
v)
The ratio of foreign liabilities in the domestic financial sector relative to money stocks (FLM), a measure of liability dollarization to proxy for the presence of currency mismatches.
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22 Kaminsky and Schmukler's (2001) capital controls index, an alternative candidate, failed to be significantly correlated with the regime choice, possibly due to the fact that it covers only 28 countries. 23 This is a modified version of Juhn and Mauro's (2002) portfolio openness measure, computed as the sum of the absolute value of the change in financial assets and liabilities, which includes (longer term) FDI and (presumably countercyclical) official flows. The latter are arguably less relevant to the hypotheses that we want to test and are therefore excluded from our measure. The distinction between de jure and de facto capital account openness (more precisely, between restrictions on capital flows and realized capital flows) is highlighted by Prassad et al. (2003) . 24 The use of the EMBI index as an indicator of financial development, also borrowed from Mauro and Juhn (2002), is motivated by the fact that non-industrial countries make it to the EMBI Global portfolio if their (typically external) sovereign bond issues have sufficient liquidity (JPMorgan, 1999) . Furthermore, EMBI indexing tends to fuel international investors interest and, through this channel, helps strengthening the country's financial links with international markets.
25 Alternative candidates such as Eichengreen et al.´s (2002) "ability to pay" measures and Levy Yeyati's (2004) deposit dollarization ratios are available only for a limited number of countries or for recent years. Table 2 shows the correlations between these different measures of financial linkages. The first four are all strongly (positively) correlated, and virtually uncorrelated with our measure of liability dollarization, with the exception of the stock of foreign assets. As the latter is available only for a limited set of countries and periods, we drop it from our empirical tests below.
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FinDev may be correlated with the size of the economy for the non-industrial sample due to the minimum trading volume required to be in the EMBI index, we include size as an additional control in the regressions to partial out this effect. Table 3 shows the results of our partial test of the financial linkages approach, for the whole sample as well as for the industrial and non-industrial subsamples. As before, our dependent variable is the de facto peg dummy.
According to the currency mismatch hypothesis, we should expect higher liability dollarization to be positively associated with the propensity to peg, openness and the propensity to peg. Notice that these results are also consistent with Aghion et al (2006) who show that exchange rate volatility enhances growth for financially developed economies. While we have not cut our sample on the basis of financial development, to the extent that developed economies are more developed financially, the fact that portfolio flows or capital account openness leads to floating regimes for developed economies but not so for less developed economies may be signaling the different impact of exchange rate volatility for the two groups.
The political economy view
A large strand of literature has studied the use of the exchange rate as a nominal anchor to reduce inflation. In particular, it has been argued that governments with a preference for low inflation but handicapped by low institutional credibility, facing the uphill task of convincing the public of their commitment to nominal stability, may adopt a peg as a "policy crutch" to tame inflationary expectations. It follows that countries with a poor institutional track record may be more prone to rely on fixed exchange rate arrangements as a second best solution to a commitment problem. As the argument goes, weak governments that are more vulnerable to "expansionary pressures" or "fiscal voracity" (i.e., pressures from interest groups with the power to extract fiscal transfers) may choose to use a peg as a way of fending off these pressures.
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27 See Drazen (2000), for an extensive review, including a careful discussion of Giavazzi and Pagano (1988) where the idea was first developed. On the fiscal voracity effect, see Tornell and Lane (1999).
To be sure, the literature does not provide an unambiguous answer regarding the sign of the link between political strength and exchange rate regimes.
Indeed, the policy crutch effect can be easily reversed: weak governments could be associated with larger deficits (or lower ability to reduce them, if needed) that makes the peg more difficult to sustain. This is particularly true in the presence of wars or social unrest, but could be extended to episodes of political turmoil or even to tranquil times to the extent that anemic governments become more vulnerable to the political pressure from interest groups. More in general, a "sustainability hypothesis" that links weak governments with either the collapse of existing pegs or the inability to launch a credible one would entail a positive correlation between political strength and pegs, rather than the other way around as the policy crutch argument would imply.
Testing these views, in turn, is challenging due to the difficulty of capturing in a single, or even a few observable variables the concepts of credibility and sustainability. Thus, we adopt a fairly candid view to examine a diverse set of variables used in the economic and political science literature to reflect political and institutional characteristics, and to assess whether they could be Since our data covers all countries in the world, long tenures may indicate both relatively successful governments, as well as long-lasting (possibly totalitarian) regimes with a high degree of control of the local political process. If so, years in office would represents a measure of government strength, possibly subject to a diminishing effect as the clout of longer governments eventually wears out. The Herfindahl index is defined as the sum of the squared seat-shares of all parties in the government. As discussed early on by Olson (1982 Olson ( , 1993 ) the atomization of political players is associated with the deepening of common pool problems, leading to greater incentives to extract from the common resources and mounting fiscal pressure. Thus, a larger value of the Herfindahl index would be associated with political strength. Finally, the legislative index of electoral competitiveness increases as the legislatures become more competitive.
Ranging from a value of 1, when there is no legislature, to a value of 7 when the largest party in congress holds less than 75% of the seats, this index would be correlated with political weakness.
We also test a fourth political variable, namely, the number of veto points in the political system (VetoPoints) as reported in Heinz's Polcon Database In both cases, we would expect to observe a negative link between the quality of institutions and the propensity to peg.
The correlations matrix reported in Table 4 This allows us to build a parsimonious specification that avoids excessive multicollinearity for the partial tests of the political approach. More precisely, we select three variables that capture, political strength (YearsinOffice, which is also included squared to test for the potential diminishing effect of long tenures noted above), political weakness (VetoPoints), and institutional quality (CPIA, available for the non-industrial sample).
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For the latter, the absence of an institutional control for the industrial sample should not be a concern to the extent that it is reasonable to assume that the differential 28 See http://info.worldbank.org/governance/kkz2002/notes.html for a more detailed description.
These ratings, prepared for a broad set of developing economies, cover the longer period influence of institutional quality on the choice of regime among developed countries, with comparably high standards, should be, at best, very minor.
As the regressions results show (Table 5) , the propensity to peg is negatively correlated with the quality of institutions, as the policy crutch view would indicate. However, the results also show that pegs are positively related to political strength, in line with the sustainability hypothesis: weak governments appear to be less prone to implement (and sustain) pegs,
although the result appears to be statistically significant only for developing economies.
How can we reconcile this second finding with the long-dated debate about the use of pegs as nominal anchors in inflationary economies -and the many historical experiences in this direction? To address this issue, it is useful to focus more narrowly on the incidence of inflation on the decision to move to a peg from a non-peg regime. Following Vegh (1992), Calvo and Vegh (1999) and Frieden et al (2000) , it could be argued that countries with moderate to high inflation have incentives to use the exchange rate as an anchor.
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However, persistent high inflation also creates pressures on the exchange rate market that may force monetary authorities to float (either voluntarily or as a consequence of a currency crisis). Thus, the correlation between inflation and exchange rate rigidity may reflect both credibility and sustainability aspects. To disentangle these two effects, and bearing in mind that most exchange rate-based stabilizations in the past were preceded by 30 There is empirical evidence that (long-lasting) pegs have been successful at reducing inflation.
See, among others, Ghosh et al. (1997) and Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2001) .
hyperinflations bursts, it is useful to differentiate moderate from high inflation (and hyperinflation) episodes known to elicit rapid policy reactions.
To that end, in the last two columns of Table 5 , we restrict our sample to countries that in the preceding period are not classified as pegs, and test the effect associated to a dummy for high inflation (High250) that is equal to one whenever the inflation rate in the previous year exceeds 250%, which we believe reflects more accurately the need for a quick credibility enhancement. Using a de facto classification, the results indicate that the probability of adopting a peg is not significantly higher in countries coming from high inflation (column iv).
One could argue, however, that the use of an exchange rate anchor is intimately related to an explicit commitment to a peg. If so, we would expect inflation-challenged governments to peg de jure (rather than de facto). This is indeed what the evidence seems to indicate (column v). When we use the de jure regime classification, the high inflation dummy becomes significant and with the expected positive sign: high inflation tends to induce the de jure adoption of an exchange rate anchor.
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These results can be illustrated by a cursory look at the data. Out of the 37 non-peg high inflation country year observations included in the regression, 16 moved to a de jure peg the following year.
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But of these, only 3 qualify as de facto pegs. This suggests that, whereas weak governments tend to 31 The choice of 250% is not arbitrary. Lower levels did not deliver significant results, indicating that the credibility effect at lower inflation rates is not sufficient to induce the choice of a peg.
Note that this amounts to 43% of the high inflation observations, significantly above the 25% probability of switching from non-peg to peg for the whole sample. implement explicit (de jure) exchange rate commitments as a policy crutch against inflation, these attempts tend to be short-lived as the peg becomes ultimately unsustainable. Thus, our preliminary findings provide a nuanced support for the policy crutch approach. On the one hand, institutional quality is inversely related to the propensity to peg, as countries rely on an exchange rate anchor to compensate for low institutional credibility. On the other, the fact that weak governments are likely to exhibit more flexible exchange rate arrangements points at sustainability as the main driving aspect.
Again, this does not contradict the view of pegs as policy crutches: it provides evidence that hard-pressed governments are prone to resort to a jure peg as a deflationary device, despite the fact that they are later on unable to sustain it.
III. Putting it all together
The previous section showed that the factors identified by the literature, taken separately, exhibit significant links to the choice of exchange rate regimes. We are ready to tackle the main objective of the paper, namely, to test the alternative hypotheses simultaneously in a framework that allows us to assess their relative importance -a crucial step given the fact that the three groups of controls are likely to be correlated with each other, potentially biasing the result of our partial tests 33 . 33 The joint test also addresses the problem that many of the variables will be related among them. For example, political instability may be correlated with financial dollarization, and so on. By estimating all variables jointly we test for the effect of the orthogonal component relative to the other regressors for each variable, thus providing a more convincing setup to interpret the effect of each variable as corresponding to its autonomous effect on the dependent variable.
To ensure consistency and comparability of the results, we put the three approaches to test by pooling the selected controls in a baseline specification and testing them jointly. 34 However, since our primary interest is to examine the relevance of different analytical approaches to the regime choice problem rather than the significance of individual variables we also report joint significance tests for each group of variables.
The results of our baseline regression, shown in Table 6 , are in line with our previous findings. As can be seen, the estimated coefficients for the whole sample (column i) reflect closely those for the non-industrial group (column ii). The propensity to peg is higher in small open economies with high levels of foreign liabilities and financial integration, poor institutional quality and strong governments. At the bottom of the table we report the Wald test of joint significance for all the coefficients corresponding to each approach -all of them strongly statistically significant. Column (iii) replicates the baseline for industrial countries. OCA variables remain strong, or even stronger, predictors of exchange rate choice.
However, capital account openness controls now show negative coefficientslike liability dollarization, which is no longer significant-supporting the impossible trinity hypothesis. Moreover, the coefficients of political variables display a less clear pattern. These results are, again, in line with our partial tests, suggesting that exchange rate policy in industrial countries, relatively free from political or financial constraints, enjoys a higher degree of independence and respond essentially to standard economic factors. Table 6 , col ii and iii, respectively) to highlight the differences between the two groups.
The results are illuminating. As can be inferred from the figure, size appears to be critical as a determinant of exchange regime: very small (large) countries choose a peg (float) almost with probability one. Openness also plays a significant role. A developing economy with a trade to GDP ratio equal to 1 is 45% more likely to choose a fixed regime than a fully closed economy.
Trade openness is even more strongly associated with the propensity to peg in industrial economies, where a 50% trade to GDP ratio virtually implies a peg. The volatility of terms of trade, important for industrials, is almost negligible for non-industrials.
The divergence of the impact of financial variables across the two groups of countries is clearly illustrated in the figure. Capital account openness has a strong negative influence on the propensity to peg for developed economies (roughly a 70% decline over the whole range), as opposed to a minor positive effect for developing ones (about 10% increase). Similarly, the slightly smaller negative effect of portfolio flows for the industrial sample mirrors what is found for non-industrials. In particular, a developing economy with flows of about 10% of GDP has a 30% higher propensity to peg than one with no flows. Moreover, as the graph indicates, virtually no developing economy with flows of 25% of GDP or higher allows its currency to float. Finally, increasing the liability dollarization ratio from zero to twice the money base raises the preference for a peg among developing economies by roughly 25%, and reduces it by about 10% in developed ones.
Finally, regarding political variables, tenure in office appears to be more relevant among non-industrials (it increases the probability of choosing a peg throughout the initial twenty years), while the number of veto points has a sizable effect for industrials (close to a 70% variation over the whole range).
Finally, governments' preference for a peg declines by 40% as countries go from low to high institutional quality. Reinhart and Rogoff (2004; RR) build an alternative de facto classification based on the "verification" of the de jure regime, reclassifying the regimes where the exchange rate behavior does not match what is expected from the stated policy. Compared with the LYS classification used here, RR offers the advantage that it corrects for multiple exchange rates, a practice that, while common among developing countries until the early 1970s, diminished steadily to less than 10 percent of cases during the post-Bretton Woods period. However, it is silent about the degree of exchange rate intervention, an aspect that is essential to characterize exchange rate policy, particularly when it comes to regime choice, to the extent that this choice is likely to depend critically on the policy constraints imposed by each regime.
Alternative regime classifications
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It is reassuring to see that our findings are broadly preserved when we rerun our baseline specification using RR (Table 7) . For the sake of comparison, the sample used in the regressions includes only those observations that are also classified under the LYS methodology (columns (i) and (ii) reproduce the results using LYS).
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As can be seen, the results for non-industrial countries 35 For example, due to the presence of multiple exchange rates, RR classify as intermediates or floats about 250 observations (or 7.5% of their database) for which the official exchange rate does not move, despite the fact that these cases display an average monthly exchange rate intervention of 4% of the monetary base, indicating that the objective of keeping the official rate constant was an effective policy constraint. 36 Note that, while RR goes farther back in time than LYS, sample coverage is not an issue for the post-Bretton Woods period studied in this paper, for which the number of classified cases is virtually the same: 3435 under LYS and 3345 under RR.
(column iii) are comparable, providing strong support for the OCA, the currency mismatch and (to a lesser extent) the sustainability hypotheses. The same can be said for industrials countries (column iv), with the notable exception of financial linkages variables (the impossible trinity effect ceases to be significant while liability dollarization appears to be positively related to pegs).
While we have been mostly concerned with the determinants of actual exchange rate policies as reflected in de facto regimes, it is interesting to examine how the determinants identified above influence the choice of de jure arrangements. With this view, columns (v) and (vi) estimate the baseline using the IMF-based de jure classification. In sum, our main findings are robust to the classification criteria, confirming the overall relevance of the OCA approach, the support for the impossible trinity view in the case of industrial countries, and the incidence of currency mismatch considerations as an incentive to peg in non-industrial countries.
Additionally, our findings are consistent with the view that countries with poor institutional quality tend to resort to pegs as policy crutches, subject to the constraints imposed by their political ability to sustain them. 37 The data on de jure regimes is taken from Ghosh et al. (2003) .
Robustness
While most of the key explanatory variables that we used can be reasonably assumed to be exogenous to the regime decision, not all are free from reverse causality concerns. For example, a peg, by reducing bilateral exchange rate volatility, may foster trade with other users of the peg currency and, in turn, may increase openness.
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Financial depth has also been associated to exchange rate regimes, as a fixed exchange rate reduces exchange rate volatility, stimulating capital flows.
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Others have argued that a peg, by creating the perception of an implicit exchange rate guarantee, fosters financial dollarization. In all three cases, the reverse link, from regime choice to openness, portfolio flows and liability dollarization, has the same positive sign as the one discussed above; hence, the potential endogeneity cannot be easily dismissed.
While in previous tests we used lagged values to attenuate the potential endogeneity, here we approach the problem more directly in two different ways. We first replicate the baseline specification (column i of Table 6 ) using initial values for openness and liability dollarization (these variables are identified with an i at the end), as well as the average of portfolio flows over the previous five years (Portfolio5), all variables that, as noted, may be affected by reverse causality. The results are reported in column (i) of Table 8: the coefficients on initial values all have the same sign as those obtained in Table 6 , and in most cases are similar in size.
38 This point is made forcefully in Frankel and Rose (1997) . See, among others, Rose and Van Wincoop (2001) and Micco, Stein and Ordonez (2003) . 39 Hausmann et al (2000) .
Correcting for endogeneity by replacing the variables with their initial values may be a highly imperfect way of dealing with the problem, particularly if some variables show country-specific or global trends that may alter them significantly over long periods of time, rendering the initial value relatively uninformative. This may be the case for financial variables such as liability dollarization and portfolio flows. To address this shortcoming, we resort to instrumental variable (IV) estimation for the portfolio flows and dollarization variables. Standard econometric packages do not carry a routine for IV estimation in logit models; thus, for proper computation of standard errors we used a bootstrapping technique. Specifically, we replicate the equation for the prediction of the endogenous variable 1000 times by bootstrapping the errors. We then replaced the instrumented variable in the exchange rate regime equation, which gave us a set of 1000 coefficients for each variable from which consistent estimators of the standard errors could be obtained.
We used these standard errors to test hypotheses in the original specification.
As predictors of portfolio flows we use income per capita (strongly correlated with portfolio flows, with higher income countries showing much larger degrees of financial integration) and the overnight LIBOR, based on the evidence that lower rates in industrial countries tend to foster capital flows, particularly towards developing countries. The results, reported in column (ii), confirm our previous findings.
One additional source of concern is the omission of relevant variables that may be correlated with (and spuriously captured by) the included regressors.
The most general way to control for (country-specific, time-invariant) omitted variables is through the use of country fixed effects. Unfortunately, the introduction of fixed effects suffers in our case from an important drawback.
By restricting information to within-country variability, it limits the scope of the exercise as some of the hypotheses tested here (most notable, OCA) involve slow moving variables. With this caveat in mind, we report in column (iii) the estimates from a fixed effect estimation of the baseline specification.
As can be seen, most results remain unchanged, with the only (expected) exception of the OCA variables that, showing little within volatility, become insignificant.
Global Trends and sensitivity analysis
Our empirical specification also allows us to test the presence of global trends in the choice of exchange rate regimes beyond and above those driven by the evolution of their underlying determinants. These trends can be recovered from the coefficients of the year dummies in any of the previous regressions.
The value of these dummies can be interpreted as the impact of common global trends not captured by the fundamentals included in the specification 41 De Nicoló et al. (2003) and Rajan (2004) provide empirical evidence along these lines. It has to be noted, however, that we implicitly assume ROL remains relatively stable over time, since the variable is available only since 1996.
as well as a bias reflecting the preferences of policy makers as a result of the evolving economic debate (or, possibly, transitory fads). Figure 2 shows the difference in the change in the probability of choosing a peg associated to each year dummy in the baseline specification (Table 6 , col.
i) evaluated at the mean values of the remaining controls. In short, these values indicate by how much the probability of choosing a peg was affected by factors beyond those captured by our fundamentals. For comparison, we replicate the exercise using the de jure regime classification.
As can be seen, year dummies obtained from de facto regimes do not display any significant trend or systematic bias over the last twenty years (i.e. since the mid eighties).
On the other hand, de jure regimes display a strong pro-fix bias that decreases steadily throughout the period. Initially countries exhibited a probability of choosing a peg that was 40% higher than warranted by fundamentals. By the end of the period this bias had fallen to 5%. These findings may be a reflection of the Bretton Woods inheritance: a prevalence of de jure pegs that were not justified by fundamentals -and, possibly because of this, plagued by frequent realignments or sudden collapses.
If so, the results may be indicating that a welcome influence of the intellectual debate on exchange rate policies (and perhaps the only one) lies in the increasing reluctance to embrace explicit exchange rate commitments when underlying fundamentals and sustainability concerns recommend otherwise. By contrast, it appears that the way in which de facto regimes relate to underlying fundamentals has remained relatively stable despite the heated discussions and frequent changes of heart that have characterized the exchange rate debate.
IV. Conclusions
The evidence presented in this paper indicates that the choice of exchange rate regimes can be traced back to a group of geographical, financial and political variables in line with the existing theories of regime determination.
While the relevance of these theories naturally depends on the particular characteristics of individual countries, our tests reveal some general patterns.
More precisely, we find that, while OCA considerations affect similarly industrial and non-industrial countries, the influence of financial linkages differs across the two groups: whereas the impossibly trinity view prevails for the former, currency mismatch concerns appear to dominate in the case of the latter. Similarly, institutional quality and sustainability aspects appear to play a substantive role only in the case of non-industrials economies.
Understanding the role played by country-specific factors in the determination of exchange rate regimes is essential to assess the convenience and the ultimate success of any attempt to induce a country to adopt a particular regime, as well as to evaluate the chances of a regime reversal down the road. The application of the "one size fits all" approach seems grossly at odds with the importance of key and identifiable fundamentals for the choice of exchange rate regimes.
To the extent that the underpinnings of the choice of exchange rate regimes has not changed in a visible way over the last two decades, one can also conclude that the intellectual discussion has been in this case far less influential than previously thought. Far from the fireworks of the academic fads, policy makers that have to choose actual exchange rate arrangements continue to balance the few simple tradeoffs suggested by the optimal currency area, the need to gain credibility and the effects of financial integration. Figure 2
